Comme les investissements directs chinois sont de plus en plus importants au Canada, il faudrait réviser les politiques canadiennes dans ce domaine. Ces politiques devraient s'appuyer sur les meilleures pratiques internationales fondées sur une compréhension précise des régimes chinois relatifs aux investissements directs à l'étranger (IDE), qui évoluent, et des entreprises étatiques chinoises (EEC), qui sont à l'origine des deux tiers des IDE chinois. Dans cet article, l'auteur examine les EEC dans les contextes chinois et international : qu'est-ce qui motive ces investissements, et en particulier ceux qui sont faits au Canada ? les politiques canadiennes sont-elles bien adaptées à l'évolution des régimes chinois en matière d'IDE ? L'auteur conclut que les régimes chinois relatifs aux IDE et aux EEC sont de plus en plus transparents et axés sur le marché, alors que les politiques canadiennes, jusqu'à la fin de 2016, sont restées assez opaques et interventionnistes. La création récente d'un nouvel organisme, Investir au Canada, laisse cependant présager un réchauffement des relations sino-canadiennes et une plus grande transparence.
Introduction
The purpose of this article is twofold: to examine (a) the drivers and future evolution of China's rapidly growing outward flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) and (b) the patterns and evolution of Chinese investments in Canada and their future implications for Canadian policies. The article begins with the evolving role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as outward investors, both globally and in the context of China's development. It then outlines China's evolving SOE policies before focusing on Chinese investments in Canada in the context of China's total FDI outflows and China's small relative position in Canada's total FDI stocks (currently less than 2 percent). Significantly, as discussed in the final section, by 2020 China will be one of the world's largest outward investors.
As the policy recommendations in the final section suggest, Canadian policy should anticipate this trend.
State-Owned Enterprises as Outward Investors
SOEs are suspected of defying market principles through the support they may receive from national governments including subsidies, concessionary finance, guarantees, and regulatory preferences or exemptions from competition policies. Yet such enterprises exist in many countries. In 2009, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries reported the existence of more than 2000 SOEs, mostly in sectors considered strategically important to competitiveness such as transportation, power generation, energy, financial institutions, and partly privatized telecommunications companies (Christiansen 2011) . The 2000 largest companies on the Forbes Global 2000 list in business year 2010-2111 included 204 SOEs. 1 Chinese enterprises were most prominent in the group with 70 SOEs, followed by India (30), Russia (9), the United Arab Emirates (9), Malaysia (8), and 1 each in Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Thailand, and Norway. China is of particular interest because of its size, projected growth path and future economic significance.
Since it joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, China's inward FDI stock has grown from a small base. Between 2006 and 2011, it doubled from just under $300 billion to $711 billion (Rosen and Hanemann 2011) . Outward FDI (OFDI) has also grown since 2006 when the government encouraged a ''going global'' policy. Since then, Chinese capital has flowed abroad at a fast pace to acquire foreign assets, particularly in the United States. Between 2009 and 2012, official data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) shows that China's stock of OFDI more than doubled. Because of China's rapid economic growth (gross domestic product [GDP] grew from $5 trillion to more than $8 trillion in this period), the ratio of OFDI to GDP grew slightly from 5 to 6 percent, but it was still much lower than Thailand's (whose ratio was 10 percent). UNCTAD statistics for 2012 rank China among the world's top dozen largest outward investors with its total stock (US$509 billion) representing 2.1 percent of the global stocks held abroad. This is still a smaller stock holding than Canada's ($715 billion or 3 percent of the total), and it is far behind US stock of $5,190 billion (22 percent) , UK ($1,808 billion, or 7.7 percent), German ($1,550 billion, or 6.5 percent), and Japanese ($1,054 billion, or 4.4 percent; UNCTAD 2013a; Figures 1 and 2 ). By 2020, however, as shown in the final section of this article, China's foreign stock holdings will be among the world's largest.
This comparison provides some perspective on such populist claims as ''China is buying up the world'' or ''building an economic empire'' (Araú jo Rodríguez and Cardenal 2013) . Two main attributes of China's outward investment prompt such claims. One is the speed of growth in the stocks since WTO accession and the second is the frequency with which investing firms are state owned and seen to play by different rules, both inside and outside of China. Until the major rationalization of SOEs in the late 1990s, China's few privately owned firms were small and focused on the domestic market; they are only now beginning to appear in international transactions. As shown later, private enterprises are gaining capabilities, and the prominence of SOEs in the Chinese economy is steadily dwindling, although they remain prominent abroad. Although it was convenient to portray China National Offshore Oil Corporation's (CNOOC's) acquisition of Nexen (the largest Chinese transaction to date) as emblematic of SOE dominance, this transaction should be seen in the context of more recent large acquisitions by privately owned enterprises (POEs), also discussed later.
State-Owned Enterprises and Chinese Development
Following the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, China was bankrupt and faced a Malthusian crisis with population growth outstripping food production. The enormous task of rebuilding the strife-torn nation was shouldered by the state. One bank was responsible for both monetary policy and financial intermediation. SOEs were set up under the control of line ministries and charged with meeting output targets at prices set by central planners. Like the agricultural communes, they had social responsibilities to provide the ''iron rice bowl'' of guaranteed employment, housing, education, and health care services for their employees. Since 1978, market principles have gradually been introduced; although banks continue to be state owned, management is directed to pursue commercial profitability. In the late 1990s, SOEs were rationalized with the closure, merger, or privatization of tens of thousands of smaller loss-making enterprises, many of them owned by lower levels of government.
Between 2003 and 2006, policy changed again, designating seven strategically important sectors critical to national security in which the state should play a leading role and SOEs should grow into leading world businesses. These world businesses would be supported by governments to facilitate exports, acquire brands, and acquire natural resources, mainly through mergers and acquisitions. With the changeover of China's top leadership in 2012-2013 and the emphasis on rebalancing the producer-dominated economy, the emphasis has shifted to increasing SOE efficiency, improving corporate governance, and reducing government intervention. Today China's SOEs are distinguished by their ownership, with 113 very large monopolies and oligopolies remaining in the hands of the central government and an uncertain number of smaller SOEs owned by provincial and municipal governments. Many operate in industries in which private firms face entry restrictions. Oversight of these enterprises is the responsibility of the StateOwned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). It receives the dividends and recycles them to SOEs in the form of financial support of restructuring, upgrading, and investments. Some reports indicate that SOEs have used the funds in ways that an investment bank would do, participating in risky but lightly regulated shadow banking activities and setting up affiliates that make property investments (World Bank 2012) .
SASAC was created in 2003 by transferring ownership of industrial SOEs from several line ministries, allocating policy and regulation to the line ministries, responsibility for oversight of state assets to SASAC, and responsibility for day-to-day operations to SOE managers. In 2006, Li Rongrong, SASAC's chairman, stated that ''state capital must play a leading role in these sectors, which are the vital arteries of the national economy and essential to national security'' (Zhao 2006 ). 2 The industries reserved for the state as sole or majority owner of enterprises included defence, power generation and distribution, petroleum and petrochemicals, telecommunications services, coal, aviation, and shipping. Central SOEs were also directed to become heavyweights in ''pillar'' industries, including machinery, automobiles, Internet technology (IT), construction, steel, base metals, and chemicals, in which non-state enterprises are also active. Reform and restructuring were encouraged to enhance competitiveness; ownership was to be diversified through shareholding or attracting strategic investors, and the number of central SOEs (161 at the time) was to be reduced.
The sizes and economic contributions of SOEs and state-invested firms are difficult to estimate because of lack of reporting and the wide range of ownership forms. Enterprise ownership is highly elastic in China, but use of the term private enterprise now applies to privately owned unlisted companies, publicly listed companies, collectively owned companies, cooperatives, jointly owned companies (including by foreign investors), and selfemployment. Such enterprises are dominant in IT and e-commerce and telecommunications equipment, real estate, and to a lesser extent in energy and autos. By this definition, private enterprises accounted for 60 percent of fixed asset investment in 2011 and 75 percent of employment (Fan and Hope 2013) . They include very large telecommunications equipment companies such as Huawei (unlisted) and ZTE (publicly listed); IT companies such as Alibaba, Tencent, Sina, and Baidu; real estate companies such as Dalian Wanda, China Vanke, Evergrande Group, and Country Garden; and a few auto companies such as Geely.
SOE shares of industrial assets, output, and employment are steadily declining ( Figure 3 ). By 2011, their absolute numbers had shrunk to less than 5 percent of total industrial enterprises. Their shrinking share of industrial output (to 12 percent) and employment (10 percent) relative to their share of total assets (to 20 percent) reflects the capital intensity of their operations. Even so, many are large conglomerates with numerous affiliates expected to carry out a range of economic and social functions. They continue to be prominent in China's international transactions, particularly direct investment. In 2008-2009, SOEs accounted for nearly 70 percent of China's stock of outward investment but only 15 percent of the projects. By far the largest number of projects (more than half the total) were accounted for by private companies, but the transactions tended to be small in size, accounting for only 21 percent of the total stock of OFDI (Huang and Wang 2011 ). An industrial breakdown of outward investment does not distinguish ownership but indicates that on average during 2008-2010 the services sectors dominated China's outflows, with primary sector investment coming second, mainly in minerals and energy. This pattern differs from world averages in which, although services dominate across the board, manufacturing industries are much more prominent as outward investors than is the case in China, which has been a major recipient of inflows ( Table 1 ). The Chinese industries that accumulated the largest stocks abroad were mainly in services (leasing and business services, banking, and wholesale-retail trade) as well as in mining, including oil and gas (Table 2) .
Many SOEs have retreated from labour-intensive industries, and most are now focused in strategic industries defined as central to national security or business competitiveness. Others, such as the three petroleum SOEs-CNOOC, China National Petroleum Corporation, and China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec)-have affiliates listed on international stock exchanges and aim to become globally diversified players. Government ownership stakes in such companies as Lenovo and Haier are less prominent, and these companies operate more independently in international markets. They are, however, favoured companies with political and personal ties at home where they face increasing competition from private enterprises and foreign firms; similarly, competition is growing in strategic sectors such as telecommunications services.
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises in China
SOEs are expected to carry out government's strategic goals. Although SASAC has improved the competitiveness and efficiency of many SOEs, their financial performance can be undermined by requirements to deliver public services and charge regulated prices for their products. An estimated one-quarter are loss making (World Bank 2012), but many others have become profitable and by some reports more efficient. In 2010, SOE profits were estimated to be 5 percent of GDP (Lardy 2012) . SOE governance is opaque, but as Downs (2010, 3) has pointed out, ''Ownership does not equal control.'' Central government SOEs are supervised and managed by SASAC; the party's Central Organization Department appoints and evaluates the performances of chief executive officers on political as well as commercial criteria regarding which return on investment is likely to rank near the top of the list, along with profitability and market share (Szamosszegi and Cole (2011) . Heads of the largest SOEs have ministerial rankings, giving them status equal to the Minister of Commerce.
The national oil companies are directed to contribute to energy security, but they must also respond to compelling commercial factors. As global latecomers, they must replace and diversify their reserves in competition with other national oil companies and the international companies; they have also had to compensate for domestic pricing favouring consumers, which has caused them to lose money in downstream operations (pricing is now moving toward market-determined levels). At the same time, they seek to become internationally competitive and world-class companies (Downs 2010 ).
In the case of CNOOC, the parent owns 64 percent of the equity in its affiliate CNOOC Limited, and 36 percent is publicly held through listings on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges. CNOOC Limited, the world's largest energy explorer by market value, acquired Nexen, a troubled Canadian oil and gas producer with significant international assets. Standard corporate information on this affiliate is transparently available through routine required disclosures. It follows standard practices in corporate governance and transparency, with internationally known non-Chinese citizens serving as independent nonexecutive directors; it has a standard committee structure populated with the independents and transparent financial and corporate social responsibility disclosures.
Are this affiliate's business decisions made by SASAC or the Chinese government on political grounds? Available evidence suggests the answer to be negative for several reasons. First, as a publicly listed company, there are many other stakeholders, including investors, employees, and regulators. Second, it is in the company's interests to observe regulatory requirements that emphasize the transparency needed to promote trust between issuer and investors. Third, the independent directors are also responsible for the transparency and accuracy of investor disclosure. Regulatory disclosures confirm this responsibility. In short, CNOOC Limited's incentive structure encourages good corporate citizenship. Even so, it is difficult for outsiders to disentangle in any definitive way the political and commercial factors in SOE investor decisions.
With the recent top leadership changes in China, further SOE restructuring is in the works but is a sensitive political topic. Policy change is more likely to be by stealth than by explicit action. SOEs' home operating environment will change in ways that force them to become more efficient. Key input prices are being deregulated, led by interest rates and the cost of capital; more sectors are being opened to competition from nonstate enterprises, as has already happened in railroads and health care. Dividend payments will be raised, cutting into SOEs' retained earnings. Recent high-profile corruption investigations in the pharmaceuticals, petrochemicals, and telecom sectors add further pressures for reform (Green, Li, and Shen 2013) .
In 2012, a controversial marker was laid down in China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious and Creative Society (World Bank 2012), a study endorsed by Premier Li Keqiang and prepared by the World Bank and the State Council's think tank, the Development Research Center. This study defines two relevant policy goals: to use state resources more efficiently and to modernize the state's governance of SOEs, advocating that government's role in production should be one that produces only public goods (World Bank 2012). It also emphasizes that government's appropriate role is to provide public goods and services that ''result in unremunerated positive externalities'' (World Bank 2012, 26) such as defence, infrastructure, social protection, and basic research and development.
Existing practices have involved multiple layers of government often working at cross-purposes and producing outcomes the opposite of what was intended. State interventions have covered a wide range of actions, from administrative approvals and inspection to industrial policy restrictions that undermine market forces in allocating resources. These discretionary actions also cause rent seeking, increase the uncertainty of the business environment, and maintain business dependence on government. Evidence that governments still own retailing and restaurant establishments, hardly public goods, underline the case for further rationalization of government ownership (World Bank 2012). Strengthening the Anti-Monopoly Law, adopted in 2008, would help as well, particularly with respect to enforcement which currently is voluntary (China 2008) .
The second challenge is to separate government's ownership from management, introduce modern corporate governance into SOEs, and eventually divest its assets to (state) asset management companies subject to stringent rules of transparency (World Bank 2012). If SASAC's mandate were revised according to this principle, it would become the regulator and supervisor of industrial SOEs rather than the owner. The scope for producing public goods remains significant mainly in social projects such as public housing and in providing reliable electricity supplies and communication channels. Modern corporate practices are gradually being introduced, as noted earlier, separating boards from senior management role from party roles in the enterprise. Accounting and external audit practices are gradually becoming more independent and transparent.
Nevertheless, ownership practices still have a long way to go. If government ownership stakes were to be transferred to professional state asset management companies, they should gradually diversify the portfolios over time and transfer dividend payments to the treasury (World Bank 2012) because there is wide support for allocating some SOE profits to social spending. As long ago as 2007 a dividend policy was approved, setting a sliding scale by the size of enterprise. Initially, the rates were phased in and set too low, but they have recently been raised, and the net has been widened to include more SOEs. Current reports indicate such changes are being debated, but there is significant pushback from such large, profitable, and politically connected entities in which incumbents would lose their privileged positions.
Outward Foreign Direct Investment: Chinese Businesses Investing Abroad
Central government SOEs are prominent players in Chinese outward investment. A ranking of the top 30 non-financial investing firms puts the petroleum SOEs at the top of the list, followed by a wide variety from other industries, some of which are non-SOEs (Table 3) . A longer list would include some well-known brands such as Huawei and ZTE, but not Lenovo (computers) and Haier (consumer appliances), which are also brands well known outside of China. The Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and China Construction Bank, which rank first and second on the Forbes Global 2000 list in 2013, are of course not included here.
The China Entrepreneur Research Institute estimates that in the first half of 2012 alone, 2,407 enterprises expanded their businesses in 117 countries, with merger and acquisitions worth $30 billion (Fu 2012) . Estimates by the Vale Center at Columbia University of the number of companies invested abroad in 2010 show that 12,000 parent companies had invested in 34,000 affiliates (Sauvant 2012) . As noted earlier, SOEs accounted for the largest share by far-69 percent-of China's stock of outward investment. By industry, 77 percent of the outward flow of transactions were in the services industries, particularly in business services, finance, and trade; only 5 percent were in manufacturing, whereas 18 percent were in mining and petroleum (Huang and Wang 2011) . Much of the activity up to now has been mergers with and acquisitions of existing businesses rather than ''greenfield'' investments in new capacity. Also as noted earlier, POEs have recently joined the fray with Shuanghui International Holdings' $4.7 billion bid Cornish (2012) and others argue that, as in OECD economies, large enterprises are often banks' highest quality credits and are able to borrow at lower rates than riskier customers. So are their competitors in international transactions. SOEs' bank loans are commercial decisions by the banks, both Chinese and foreign owned in China. The fact that smaller non-state enterprises may be charged higher interest rates should be seen as a reflection of the still-immature risk management capabilities of Chinese banks (see Cornish 2012; Dobson 2009; Fan and Hope 2013) .
Chinese enterprises also face several disadvantages when investing abroad. First, they are inexperienced latecomers; many of the world's most desirable assets and locations have already been taken by experienced investors from more advanced economies. Second, although many of the SOEs are huge oligopolies or monopolies in the home market with close ties to their government owners and regulators and little competition in the home market, they have little experience with market-based international business practices and global rules of the road. Lack of such knowledge can erode the profitability of a transaction when inexperienced managers overpay for an asset or misinterpret or fail to take local business conditions and regulatory environments into account in their operations. Third, rightly or wrongly, Chinese SOEs have gained a reputation for failing to apply market principles in their strategic and operational decisions. This perception problem matters for at least two reasons. One is the importance of market principles to the realization of benefits to the host economy. The second reason is that such perceptions undermine the trust and transparency that are fundamental building blocks of efficient markets. Both imply that Chinese SOEs need to overcompensate with efforts to develop a ''brand'' for commercially oriented decision making.
Perceptions about political rather than commercial decision making underlie national security concerns, which are a particular worry in advanced countries receiving large shares of Chinese outward investment. SOEs acting as agents of the Chinese government will undermine national sovereignty of the host country. Such concerns are magnified by China's opaque political system and the 2006 decision to expand the roles of SOEs in sectors considered critical to China's national and economic security. Another concern is investors' willingness to abide by host countries' regulatory regimes, one that has been amplified by recent reports of cyberattacks on government and enterprises networks traced back to the Chinese military. I return to these issues later.
National security concerns aside, there is plenty of evidence to support the contention that although Chinese investing enterprises have commercial objectives similar to those of other multinationals, they are on a steep learning curve in understanding and abiding by rules of the road in international business and host country regulatory regimes. Evidence of learning can be found in a survey of nearly 20 Chinese overseas investments that showed that although early investments in natural resources may have been intended to direct supplies to the home market, the majority of recent investments aim to expand global supplies in response to world market prices (Moran 2010) . The opaque governance of the Chinese parents of affiliates investing abroad is a problem, and reports of aggressive hacking into the systems of Western companies do not help. As Chinese enterprises gain more international experience and profile, however, it is likely that market pressures and pressures from informed and vigilant national regulators will encourage greater transparency and alignment with best international practice.
Taking these concerns together, the increasingly intense regulatory scrutiny suggests that extra efforts are needed by Chinese investors to demonstrate their intention to meet host country concerns. Enterprises in technologically sensitive businesses such as telecommunications face particularly intense scrutiny in the United States and United Kingdom. Besides CIFIUS scrutiny, companies such as Huawei and ZTE have been studied by the US House Committee on Intelligence, whose chair in late 2012 released a critical report alleging bribery and corruption and requested an investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (CBC News 2012). Chinese media and regulatory pressures on Apple's Chinese operations in April 2013 suggested tit-for-tat behaviour, which adds to unease.
Chinese Enterprises Investing in Canada
Large-scale Chinese investment in Canada is a relatively recent phenomenon and accounted, according to Canadian statistics, for less than 2 percent of the total inward stock in 2012. Historically, of course, American investment is the dominant share of Canada's FDI stock, but it has declined in relative terms from 61 percent of the total in 2000 to 51 percent in 2012. It is followed by Japan and, since 2004, Brazil, whose shares are both less than 3 percent (Figure 4) . The Heritage Foundation's Investment Tracker, which measures transactions over $100 million, reports that Australia ranks as China's top destination for transactions recorded between 1 January 2005 and 30 June 2013, with Canada ranked third after the United States and Australia. By that date, Chinese inflows to Australia totalled US$ 59.2 billion, followed closely by the United States (US$57.8 billion), Canada (US$37.6 billion), Brazil (US$28.2 billion), and Indonesia (US$25.8 billion). The sectoral breakdown of China's global investments is dominated by energy and power, which account for nearly half (47 percent) of the total, followed by metals at 23 percent and finance at less than 10 percent (Scissors 2013, 3 the sectoral patterns of total foreign investment as reported by national sources in Canada, the United States, and Australia (Table 5 ). In Canada, investments reported in natural resources and petroleum were slightly smaller than those in management of companies and enterprises, trailed by finance. Both sectors saw growth at similar 13 percent rates over the period. In the United States, manufacturing, retail trade, and finance dominate the picture, whereas in Australia, mineral exploration and development and ''real estate'' dominate inflows (similar stock data were not available), followed by manufacturing and services. These differences should not be a surprise as they reflect each country's comparative advantage.
Canadian Policy and Regulation
The advantages of FDI to host countries include portfolio diversification using foreign capital, access to the technologies and international supply chains of foreign firms, and increased domestic competition from themall factors that contribute to faster growth and more efficient use of resources. If that was all there was to it, there would be few constraints on commercial decisions. Many argue that it is in the national interest to seek foreign capital to develop Alberta's oil sands. The Canadian Energy Research Institute has estimated that more than $100 billion will be required for oil sands investments in 2004 -2019 (Grant 2012 . This is on top of the $40 billion overall investment in oil and gas extraction in 2007-2011 period and $9 billion in mining. As Grant (2012) points out, these investments were largely funded by Canadian savings and heavily expose domestic portfolios as a result. Foreign funding can diversify these risks. Recent oil price declines and CNOOC's troubled Nexen acquisition are short-term developments that do not change the long-term importance of policies that facilitate such diversification.
Weighed against these benefits of inward FDI are three main policy concerns about Chinese investment: enterprise ownership, asymmetric access for Canadian firms to the Chinese market, and national security concerns. Several other more implicit concerns include lack of trust, foreignness, and concerns about unfair competition. All of these concerns have been analyzed carefully in Bergevin and Schwanen (2011), Cornish (2012) , Grant (2012) , Moran (2012) and Assaf and McGillis (2013) and are summarized here.
Ownership
Ownership is an important issue in several countries, including Canada. Concerns about politically driven decisions need checks against actual behaviour. China's largest enterprises (so far mostly SOEs) are largely consistent with those of multinationals seeking to access new markets, natural resources, and the acquisition of technologies and brands. It is important to realize that the policy environment at home is changing; home markets are increasingly competitive-ones in which they must compete successfully or die-which can mean that foreign operations are the only way to expand their businesses. Indeed, as China's growth slows in the years ahead, they are even more likely to pursue additional offshore markets.
Cornish (2012) has argued, and as the earlier description of CNOOC Limited illustrates, SOE boards and management focus exclusively on the company's interests; to serve those interests, they must conform to stock exchange and host country rules and regulations. Market pressures on buyer-seller relationships provide a more cogent interpretation of their behaviour. At the same time, as new arrivals in international markets, managements are still learning the rules of the road, which differ radically from those in the close (but evolving) business-government relationships at home. In its quest for Nexen, CNOOC Limited invested heavily in the approval process, committing to allocate half of board and management positions to Canadians, invest in Nexen's assets, make Calgary the headquarters for CNOOC operations in Central and North America, run the company by commercial principles, and maintain Nexen's high profile for corporate social responsibility. Hill & Knowlton managed the public face of the transaction and the demonstration of the company's ability to meet the net benefits test. Nexen shareholders overwhelmingly approved the proposal, and CFIUS cleared the transaction involving US assets albeit with restrictions on assets in the Gulf of Mexico, whose details are not publicly available.
It is worth noting that available information on the terms of financing for the $15.1 billion cash offer for Nexen indicates that a consortium of 5 Chinese and 15 international banks (including BMO and Scotiabank) provided $6 billion bridge loans at London Interbank Offered Rate plus 80 and upfront fees of 25 basis points. Although the full funding profile had not been publicly disclosed at the time of this article's writing, it is expected to closely resemble the package assembled for the earlier Unocal bid but with less financing from the parent. 3 
Asymmetry in Market Access
Asymmetry in market access is an issue in many countries. Framing it as reciprocity, as has happened in Canada, is misleading because that term refers to an attribute of much broader trade negotiations based on comparative advantage. The real concern is that access for Canadian firms to China's market should be equivalent to what is offered Chinese firms entering Canada. This is a reasonable general principle, but China is still building its institutions to regulate FDI, and the two countries have different sources of comparative advantage.
National Security
The third issue is national security. Most countries screen foreign investments for risks to national security, but the interpretations and tests are highly variable and have varying degrees of opacity. The US regime carried out by CFIUS is relatively transparent with consideration of seven identifiable factors (see Bergevin and Schwanen 2011 ). Canada's regime is relatively opaque, reflecting a variety of views. There are some conflicting corporate views that ownership of natural resource enterprises is a strategic issue, whereas others argue that it is difficult to see how foreign investments in natural resources of which Canada is the ultimate owner pose a strategic threat. Moran (2012) proposes three national security issues for which investment screening makes sense: market dominance of supply that penalizes the host country, transferring technology that harms host country interests, or engaging in sabotage or espionage. These are serious concerns. Is restricting investment the most effective way to address them? This is a blunt instrument that denies access to foreign capital and international supply chains. Canadian regulators should be enforcing their own regimes for oversight of safety, environment, labour laws, and financial transparency and soundness. The Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, for example, closely supervises all banks operating in Canada, including the Chinese-owned schedule 2 banks. Canada's natural resources are owned by the provinces, and provincial governments oversee the leasing, licensing, and royalty regimes for such resources. These resources cannot be moved abroad without official permission. Canada's rules and regulations and their enforcement should reflect its national interests.
As to concerns that SOEs and their affiliates take orders from government owners to tie up supplies for their own use, Moran (2010) documents an evolution in behaviour of natural resource-seeking SOEs from that which did seek to tie up supplies for Chinese use (as Japanese investors sought to do in the 1970-1980s) to investing in production for international markets. It should also be recalled that Industry Canada requires SOEs to operate on a commercial basis. Nor is there any transport infrastructure available to export significant quantities of oil and gas to Asia. Even if there were, exports would have to satisfy the National Energy Board's net surplus tests.
Finally, it should be noted that recent oil price declines and volatility as well as the troubled outcomes of the high-profile CNOOC-Nexen acquisition might be seen to undermine arguments favouring more foreign funding. In response, it can be argued that such shortterm events do not change the argument made earlier in this section that foreign capital that helps diversify domestic investment portfolios is desirable in the reduction of long-term risks.
Future Trends and Their Implications for Canadian Policy

Reevaluating the Existing Regime
Canada is a country in need of international capital to realize fully its comparative advantage based on abundant natural resources. China is a major potential source of capital from both private and state enterprises. The Prime Minister's December 2012 policy statement , added to the existing opaque net benefits and national security tests, has raised the risks that the development of the oil sands resource will be underfunded for several reasons. 4 First, the policy increases the cost of capital and reduces potential investor interest by increasing the uncertainties about approval of the transaction. A related issue is that the net benefits test raises transactions costs relative to alternative locations in countries with more transparent processes and less uncertainty. It is impossible to value proposals that are withdrawn before the approval process, and Industry Canada does not publish statistics on proposals that are withdrawn during the approval process. Second, the size restrictions introduced in December 2012 will discourage private equity investors for whom exit strategies are a key dimension of their highrisk investment decisions. Large players provide potential exit channels, and if they decline in number, so too will the potential value of such investments. Those firms likely to suffer most from reduced funding, paradoxically, will be emerging players whose viability and pace of development could be undermined by perceptions among potential investors of political whim in Canada. Third, restrictions on investments by large firms reduce market discipline and the threat of takeover for Canadian-owned enterprises by shielding them from potential takeovers that are attracted by poor managerial performance. Fourth, as noted earlier, the existing regime limits diversification of long-term risks faced by Canadian investors.
Canada's ambiguous net benefits test and national security review process are also vulnerable to politicization. Both put the onus of proof on the investor rather than on the reviewing minister. Although vagueness and uncertainty may increase the leverage of Canadian authorities, it reduces foreign investment and leaves open the possibility of politicized decisions that protect Canadian firms from foreign competition. Comparison with the Australian regime shows striking differences in the threshold for reviews, the transparency of the tests applied (Australia provides a transparent list of the factors it takes into account), the transparency of the minister's decision (the Australian minister provides a transparent public explanation), and accountability (the onus is on the Australian government to explain why it will not allow a transaction; Bergevin and Schwanen 2011) . In contrast, Canada's screening applies to all new FDI; its net benefit test is subjective, opaque, and interventionist; reasons for decision are not necessarily made public; and the onus is on the investor to show net benefits.
There are key implications for policy as Bergevin and Schwanen (2011), Cornish (2012) , Grant (2012) , Moran (2012) , and Assaf and McGillis (2013) have argued. Canada should revise its review regime in several ways: The economic and national security tests should be clearer about the factors under review (such as Moran's [2012] three national security threats); SOE guidelines should clarify performance expectations; and the onus should shift to the federal government to show why the investment does not satisfy the national interest, further adding to transparency.
The policy emphasis on ownership means that Canadians have failed to make use of other policy tools. More emphasis on behaviour would mean taking more responsibility for the knowledge and skills of Canadian regulators. Canada has well-established regulatory regimes ranging from competition policy to regulation of firm behaviour with respect to financial soundness, labour laws and worker safety, and environmental protection. It may be that Canadian regulators need to increase their understanding of the business and policy environments of the home countries of firms investing in Canada, including SOEs from China but also firms from Brazil, India, Russia, and even Mexico. With more expertise, they could improve their capabilities to monitor foreign firm behaviour and any undertakings they may have provided to Industry Canada. Canadian educational institutions should offer training programs on these regulatory regimes to foreign executives-activities that are well established in some US business and technical schools. Also, Canadian officials should be working with foreign officials to identify each government's expectations of foreign firm behaviour and to evaluate how such firms are treated. In the case of China, such activity could build directly on the China-Canada Complementarity study completed by officials (Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Development 2012).
Reevaluating Canadian Policy Assumptions
The other key policy issue is Canadian assumptions about Chinese enterprises. Such assumptions are becoming dated as China's policy regimes evolve. Three main changes are underway as China's new leaders push economic reforms leading to eventual opening of China's capital account. First, the FDI regime is changing. Not only is the old restrictive FDI regime inconsistent with the new growth model, particularly in services and high-tech manufacturing, but competition resulting from a more liberal regime will create pressures on the large state monopolies in energy and finance. Second, China has now built the institutions needed to regulate inward FDI, having adopted a competition policy, a negative list approach (in which everything beyond a designated list of exceptions is allowed), and an FDI screening body aimed at national security concerns. Third, foreign concerns about asymmetric market access now matter to Chinese enterprises, which have more to lose in fulfilling their ambitions abroad by continuing the current restrictive and internally inconsistent approaches at home (Hanemann and Bao 2013) . The decisions to proceed with the stalled negotiation of a China-US bilateral investment treaty and an experiment to liberalize existing FDI rules as part of the new Shanghai Free Trade Zone will push things along.
As noted earlier, Chinese OFDI will increase inexorably in the years ahead. If the current 6 percent OFDI stock relative to its GDP 5 were to be maintained for the rest of this decade, by 2020, when GDP is projected by Goldman Sachs to double to around $14 trillion, the OFDI stock could be $700 billion which would be similar to stocks accumulated over much longer periods by Canada and Japan. More bullish estimates put GDP at $20 trillion and the OFDI stock at least $1 trillion, possibly $2 trillion (Rosen and Hanemann 2011) , which would still be a quarter to one-half the US total today.
In Canada, the Chinese OFDI stock measured by Statistics Canada more than doubled between 2008 and 2012, from $5.6 billion to $12 billion (Statistics Canada, 2016) , increasing Canada's share of China's total OFDI to more than 2 percent. Note that this happened at a time when the shares of the other major investing countries in Figure 4 were static or declining. In 2013, with the inclusion of the CNOOC-Nexen transaction, the stock in Canada at least doubled again to nearly 5 percent of the total. Even if Canada's share continued at 2 percent to 2020, it would total $40 billion, or about 40 percent of the Canadian Energy Research Institute's estimated financing needs for the period.
Chinese firms are on a learning curve, not only with respect to reforms in markets and corporate governance at home, but with respect to the regimes governing international business in host countries such as Canada. In response, the federal government should build on its recent Complementarity Study in which officials from both countries worked together on seven sectors in which both sides have interests and growth opportunities to identify complementarities and issues that need to be addressed. For example, in natural resources, the study recognized that
To take advantage of complementarities in this sector, further improvements could be made in the clarity, efficiency and predictability of inward investment-related regulations, the compatibility of certification systems and the expediency of approval process on goods such as equipment. (Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade 2012) Officials from both countries should continue to meet periodically for mutual discussions that follow up on such issues.
Or will Ottawa reject Chinese suitors? Increasingly, these suitors will be non-SOE investors seeking to add Canadian assets to their supply chains, to acquire technology and expand markets using Canada as a base for North America or the Western hemisphere. Such transactions could be very much in the national interest and are trends that should be encouraged.
Yet Canada continues to send mixed messages, placing obstacles in the path of SOE investors through the exceptional circumstances test introduced in December 2012 while deepening the two-way economic relationship with the signing of the Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement in September 2012 to provide investors in both countries with more assurance about the future safety of their assets. 6 Building on the Complementarity Study would be a wise investment in better understanding each government's objectives, encouraging high standards of corporate governance and interpreting policy and institutional differences to find mutually acceptable solutions.
Canada needs a simpler, more transparent policy framework that focuses mainly on national security issues. It should be transparent and focus on investor behaviour rather than ownership through competent and wellinformed regulatory oversight. The basic issue with China is one of bridging differences between economic systems, a process that should be guided by the principle of mutual learning. The end goal should be to improve competitiveness and contribute to the development of both sending and receiving countries.
Three years after the publication of an earlier version of this article as a University of Calgary School of Public Policy Research Paper, the policy environment has changed with the election in 2015 of a new federal government. Under the Trudeau regime, there are indications that Canadian policies and institutions will be more welcoming to foreign investors, not least with the proposed Invest in Canada hub that will provide a ''concierge service'' for foreign investors. To the extent that it attracts foreign capital, such a service will diversify risks to domestic investment portfolios. Such a policy, however, should not overlook the desirability of a wellinformed regulatory focus on investor behaviour. The timing is particularly fortuitous in that Chinese stateowned and non-state enterprises have in the past three years poured capital into US and European acquisitions, both large and small in size, and in a wide variety of industries including services, technology sectors, and media and entertainment. The warming political relationship with Canada following leaders' meetings held in each country in September 2016 has stimulated greater interest on both sides in attracting Chinese investments, including merger and acquisition activity, in a range of industries beyond the traditional natural resources focus.
